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Can subsidizing alternative energy technology development lead 
to faster global warming?
Abstract:  Modelling global climate changes without taking account of the changes in 
resource markets can produce climate policy with perverse consequences.  In even the 
simplest economic model of emissions of greenhouse gases, naïve policies that ignore 
markets can lead to perverse outcomes- the opposite of that intended by the policy-
makers- such as accelerating global warming.  Yet the global climate models that are 
commonly used to develop climate policy do not adequately model resource markets.  
As a consequence, we need to develop better models of resource markets within our 
global climate models. 3
Introduction
In his 1945 book “Open Society and Its Enemies”, the philosopher Karl Popper 
developed the notion of the Law of Unintended Consequences.  This “law” of social 
sciences stated that for every piece of social regulation there will be consequences of the 
regulation that were not envisaged by the promoters of the regulation.  Popper warned 
that achieving aims through social regulation might be more difficult than was expected.
In some situations we have an even stronger outcome: the eventual result of the social 
regulation is the exact opposite of what the promoters of the regulation were trying to 
achieve.  I highlight two examples of perverse outcomes in environmental legislation.  
In both cases the intention of the legislation was to improve environmental quality.  The 
CAFE fleet fuel mileage laws were promoted by the Sierra Club and other 
environmental groups in the 1970s as a way of increasing average fuel efficiency of the 
U.S. car fleet.  A partial driving ban was imposed on cars in Mexico City in the hope of 
reducing the amount of driving and improving air quality.  
Under the CAFE regulations in the U.S., light trucks were treated preferentially, as a 
political token to the U.S. agricultural lobby to ensure the passage of the legislation.  
However this preferential treatment meant that luxury light trucks, the sports utility 
vehicles, became the most profitable vehicle line for Detroit car-makers.  Thus the 
sports utility vehicle (or “SUV”) was the creation of the environmental lobby’s actions 
to increase fuel efficiency (see Thorpe 1997).  As luxury SUVs have lower fuel 
efficiency than equivalent luxury cars, the net result of switching consumers from 
luxury cars to luxury SUVs would be to lower fuel efficiency.  Despite (or because of) 
continuing CAFE standards, Portney et al (2003) reported that the combined new 
vehicle average fuel economy of US cars fell 6 per cent from 1987 to 2002.
Another case of a perverse outcome was a driving ban on cars in Mexico City in 1989.  
Based on the last digit of a car’s license plate, cars could not drive on certain days of the 
week.  However Eskeland and Feyzioglu (1997) found that gasoline consumption rose 
after the driving ban was put in place.  They found that residents in Mexico City 
changed from exporting used cars to the rest of Mexico prior to the ban to importing 
cars from the rest of Mexico after the ban.  Residents of Mexico City presumably 
responded to the ban by acquiring second cars with different licence plates, and perhaps 
lower fuel efficiency, to get around the ban.  
A similar result could occur in the case of accelerating research and development of 
renewable energy sources.  The hope of renewable energy research is that new sources 
of renewable energy will lead to less consumption of fossil fuels, lower emissions of 
GHGs and so less future global warming.  This belief is very widespread, but is this 
belief warranted?
Economists from the Australian Bureau of Agricultural and Resource economics 
(ABARE) have pointed to the faster development of renewable sources of energy as an 
efficient means of achieving long-term reductions in emissions of GHGs (Fisher et al 
2004 and Ford et al 2006).  One of the core planks of the Asia-Pacific Partnership on 
Clean Development and Climate which had its inaugural meeting in Sydney, Australia, 4
in 2006 is that accelerating the development of renewable energy is a preferable path to 
limiting global warming than is the Kyoto Protocol path of quantity restrictions on GHG 
emissions.    
However the perverse possibility exists that faster development of renewable energy 
technology will lead to faster consumption of fossil fuels, higher rates of GHG 
accumulation in the atmosphere and higher global warming.  This response to new 
technology may seem impossible at first, however it is a simple market response to 
changing future prices.  As global climate models do not generally have resource prices 
or resource suppliers in the models, these perverse responses do not appear in our 
current climate models.
The mistake in current global climate models is to assume that markets are static and 
that suppliers of fossil fuels will not react to perceived future changes in the market for 
their product.  But it seems only reasonable that the knowledge that future prices of 
fossil fuels will change will lead to changes in the supply of fossil fuels today.  If we 
incorporate resource prices and suppliers into our global climate models, are the results 
of climate change policies such as development of alternative energy sources or taxes 
on carbon emissions affected?
In the next section I lay out the basic model and then explore some simulation work to 
determine whether we might expect to see a perverse outcome.  In order to model the 
effects of climate change policy, the impact of a policy on the energy market is first 
produced and then these numbers from a stylized energy market are used in a climate 
change model to assess the impact on the global climate.
A model of the energy market with a renewable substitute
The simplest model of fossil fuel consumption over time is to assume that we can solve 
the social planner problem of optimally distributing a limited reserve of fossil fuels 
across a limited number of time periods.  We have a social planner who is trying to 
maximize the present value of social utility over time.  Assume that social utility is 
separable and additive in time, can be measured in dollar units and that future utility is 
discounted at the rate, β.  Utility at time t, U, is assumed to be only a function of energy 
consumption at time t, Et.  This set-up is a standard one in the resource economics 
literature dating back to Hotelling (1931).
Energy can be supplied in one of two ways.  Fossil fuel consumption, Eft, draws down a 
limited supply of a non-renewable resource from initial reserves of Rf0.  Fossil fuel can 
be extracted at a per unit cost of Cft.  We assume initially that the extraction cost is 
constant over time.  The infinite sum of fossil fuel extraction must be less than the 
initial supply
Renewable energy or “renewables”, Ert, can be produced at a per unit cost, Crt, which is 
declining over time due to development of new renewable energy technologies.  The 
renewable energy might be photovoltaic or wind energy or some other form of 
renewable technology.  Only non-GHG-producing renewables are considered in this 5
model, as the primary concern that we have is GHG emissions, rather than energy 
scarcity.
Our social maximization problem becomes a non-linear programming problem over a
time period between today, time 0, and an end period, time T:
Max  Σ β
t-1[U(Et) – Cft Eft – Crt Ert]
Subject to
Et = Eft + Ert
Σ Eft ≤ Rf0
Assume initially that the only policy option available to the government is to subsidize 
the development of new technologies for renewable energy.  Research and development 
of renewable energy technology will lead to lower per unit production costs for 
renewables over time.  Higher levels of government subsidies accelerate the fall in 
renewable energy prices leading to a lower path over time for the price of renewables.
Fossil fuel and renewables are assumed to be perfect substitutes, so the price of fossil 
fuels can not climb higher than the price of renewables.  Initially fossil fuels will be 
cheaper than renewable energy, so social utility is higher initially consuming only fossil 
fuels.  However as there is only a limited level of reserves for fossil fuels, the fossil fuel 
price will rise over time due to the implicit scarcity price- the “Hotelling rule”.
At some future date, fossil fuel prices will rise above the renewables price, and the 
economy will switch over from fossil fuel to renewables.  At the time of switch-over, all 
of the fossil fuels will have been consumed.  The renewable technology in this case is 
known as the “back-stop” technology in the natural resources literature (see Dasgupta 
and Heal 1974). 
One consequence of a lower price path for renewables is that the switch-over date will 
be brought forward in time.  Since all of the fossil fuels are consumed by this switch-
over date, consumption of fossil fuels must be higher at each point before the switch-
over.  It is easiest to see this effect in a simple parameterized model.  No attempt is 
made to fit the model to the real energy market.  The simulations in the next section are 
intended to be illustrative of the possibilities, rather than predictive.  
Simulations
Assume that utility of energy consumption is a simple quadratic function:
U(Et) = 10 Et -  ½  Et
26
Our discount rate β is 0.9, Cft is zero and Rf0 is 50.  Assume for our first simulation that 
Crt is 6.  We could assume a declining path over time for renewables, but for our 
analysis all that matters is the price of renewables at the time of the switch over.
We need only solve for this problem for 10 time periods.  The parameter values are 
chosen so that the switch-over date is inside of 10 time periods.  After the switch-over 
date, history essentially ends, and the solution thereafter is static over time.  
Conveniently this allows us to express a infinite period problem within a finite period 















1 7.2 2.8 42.8 0.0
2 6.9 3.1 35.9 0.0
3 6.6 3.4 29.3 0.0
4 6.3 3.7 23.0 0.0
5 5.9 4.1 17.1 0.0
6 5.5 4.5 11.6 0.0
7 5.0 5.0 6.6 0.0
8 4.5 5.5 2.0 0.0
9 2.0 6.0 0.0 2.0
10 0.0 6.0 0.0 4.0
The price of energy is rising over time, and the consumption of energy is falling.  
During the 9
th time period, the economy switches from fossil fuels to renewables.  After 
the 10
th time period and onwards, the price of energy and consumption of energy are 
constant.
Assume that the government subsidizes the development of renewable energy 
technologies and drops the eventual price of renewable energies to 4.  If we run the 














1 7.9 2.1 42.1 0.0
2 7.7 2.3 34.4 0.0
3 7.4 2.6 27.0 0.0
4 7.2 2.8 19.8 0.0
5 6.9 3.1 12.9 0.0
6 6.6 3.4 6.3 0.0
7 6.3 3.7 0.0 0.0
8 0.0 4.0 0.0 6.0
9 0.0 4.0 0.0 6.0
10 0.0 4.0 0.0 6.0
The price of energy is rising over time, and the consumption is falling.  The switch-over 
date has been brought forward to the 8
th time period.  However the path of energy prices 
is lower and the consumption is higher for all time periods.  These changes are identical 
to the algebraic results of Levy (2000).
As can be seen from comparing the results of Simulation 1 and Simulation 2, a lower 
eventual price for renewables will accelerate the consumption of fossil fuels.  Since the 
atmosphere is a product of the time profile of GHG emissions, this will produce an 
acceleration of global warming.
I use Nordhaus’ model of global warming, his RICE/DICE model, presented in papers 
such as Nordhaus (1992, 1999) to illustrate the effects of a faster rate of consumption of 
a fixed fossil fuel resource.  A spreadsheet version of the RICE and DICE models are 
available through Nordhaus’ webpage at http://nordhaus.econ.yale.edu/.  Interpret each 
time period in the simulations as decades starting in 2005 and each observation on 
consumption as annual consumption in gigatons of carbon dioxide equivalents.    
The time paths global temperatures under Simulations 1 and 2 are graphed in Figure 1.  
Temperature is displayed by decade for each of the two simulations.  The temperature 
given here is relative to pre-industrial time, as Nordhaus uses.  Approximately the same 
peak temperature is reached on each time path, however Simulation 2 with the faster 
time profile for consumption rises faster and peaks sooner than Simulation 1.  
Temperature ultimately starts to decline in this model as GHG emissions cease after 
period 9, as the deep oceans slowly pull the carbon dioxide from the atmosphere. 8
























We have an example of Popper’s Law of Unintended Consequences.  A policy of 
promoting renewables technology was put in place in order to reduce global warming, 
however in this simulation, the policy lead to higher global temperatures sooner.
A similar problem arises if we introduce a tax on fossil fuels as a means of reducing 
GHG emissions.  Assume we use the same simulated parameters in Simulation 1 as 
above with an eventual cost of renewables of 6.  If we add a tax on fossil fuel 














1 6.30 3.70 43.696 0.00
2 6.13 3.87 37.562 0.00
3 5.95 4.05 31.615 0.00
4 5.74 4.26 25.873 0.00
5 5.52 4.48 20.356 0.00
6 5.27 4.73 15.089 0.00
7 4.99 5.01 10.094 0.00
8 4.69 5.31 5.400 0.00
9 4.36 5.64 1.036 0.00
10 1.04 6.00 0.000 2.96
Compared to the results in Simulation 1, a tax on fossil fuel production slightly slows 
down GHG emissions, but the total quantity of fossil fuel consumed is the same.  The 
cost of extraction of the fossil fuels is so low that no tax short of the cost of renewable 9
energy would lead to some reserves being unused.  However if the tax is anticipated by 
the energy markets, we can have another perverse result.  A future tax intended to slow 
down fossil fuel consumption can actually accelerate the emissions of GHGs.
If the tax is envisaged to occur starting in period 7, the energy market will react in 















1 7.95 2.05 42.05 0.00
2 7.74 2.26 34.31 0.00
3 7.52 2.48 26.79 0.00
4 7.27 2.73 19.53 0.00
5 6.99 3.01 12.53 0.00
6 6.69 3.31 5.84 0.00
7 4.36 5.64 1.47 0.00
8 1.47 6.00 0.00 2.53
9 0.00 6.00 0.00 4.00
10 0.00 6.00 0.00 4.00
Comparing the results of Simulation 4 to the results in Simulation 1, if the energy 
markets anticipate a future tax on fossil fuel production, producers will accelerate 
current production, current prices will drop and GHG emissions will accelerate.  If we 
put these numbers through the Nordhaus climate model, we would see the same general 
path for global temperatures as we saw for the case of accelerated renewables 
development.
A complication- multiple sources of fossil fuels
The simulations up to this point have assumed that all fossil fuels were available for 
extraction at a low and constant cost (relative to market price).  Allowing for the 
existence of different sources of fossil fuels at different extraction costs changes the 
analysis significantly.  Whether we have perverse results now depends on the 
distribution of fossil fuel costs.
There is a large literature on the optimal extraction strategy when there are multiple 
sources with differing costs.  I assume that extraction costs are constant within each 
source, but differ across the sources.  Heal (1976), Solow and Wan (1976) and Kemp 
and Long (1980) established that it is always optimal to extract the resource in order of 
increasing cost sources if there was some mechanism for consumption smoothing or 
saving in the economy other than the fossil fuel resource itself.  Long-lived capital 
projects should adequately serve this role.10
The same simulation numbers from the previous section are used except now there are 
two sources of fossil fuel.  One source has a constant extraction cost of zero with initial 
reserves of 25, while the other source has a constant extraction cost of 5 with initial 





















1 6.2 0.0 0.0 3.8 18.8 25.0
2 5.8 0.0 0.0 4.2 13.0 25.0
3 5.4 0.0 0.0 4.6 7.6 25.0
4 4.9 0.0 0.0 5.1 2.6 25.0
5 2.6 1.8 0.0 5.6 0.0 23.2
6 0.0 4.4 0.0 5.6 0.0 18.8
7 0.0 4.3 0.0 5.7 0.0 14.5
8 0.0 4.2 0.0 5.8 0.0 10.3
9 0.0 4.2 0.0 5.8 0.0 6.1
10 0.0 4.1 0.0 5.9 0.0 2.0
11 0.0 2.0 2.0 6.0 0.0 0.0
12 0.0 0.0 4.0 6.0 0.0 0.0
13 0.0 0.0 4.0 6.0 0.0 0.0
14 0.0 0.0 4.0 6.0 0.0 0.0
The low cost source is exhausted then the higher cost source of fossil fuels is consumed 
before the switch-over to renewables occurs.  Even though the total reserves of fossil 
fuels is the same as in Simulation 1, the higher cost of the second source of fossil fuels 
means that the consumption path is lower than in Simulation 1, and the switch-over date 
in period 11 is later.
If development of renewables technology will result in a cost of renewables that is 
greater than the higher cost source of fossil fuels, we will have the same result as in 
Simulation 2.  Development of cheaper renewables sooner will lead to an earlier switch-
over date, an accelerated path of fossil fuel consumption and accelerated global 
warming.
However if the eventual cost of the renewable energy is less than the higher priced 
source of fossil fuels, our result will be drastically different.  If technological 





















1 7.0 0.0 0.0 3.0 18.0 25.0
2 6.7 0.0 0.0 3.3 11.3 25.0
3 6.4 0.0 0.0 3.6 4.9 25.0
4 4.9 0.0 1.1 4.0 0.0 25.0
5 0.0 0.0 6.0 4.0 0.0 25.0
6 0.0 0.0 6.0 4.0 0.0 25.0
7 0.0 0.0 6.0 4.0 0.0 25.0
8 0.0 0.0 6.0 4.0 0.0 25.0
9 0.0 0.0 6.0 4.0 0.0 25.0
10 0.0 0.0 6.0 4.0 0.0 25.0
11 0.0 0.0 6.0 4.0 0.0 25.0
12 0.0 0.0 6.0 4.0 0.0 25.0
13 0.0 0.0 6.0 4.0 0.0 25.0
14 0.0 0.0 6.0 4.0 0.0 25.0
As in the previous simulations, the cheaper renewables accelerates the consumption of 
the fossil fuels from the cheaper source.  However the more expensive source is not 
used, instead the economy switches to the renewables at period 4, jumping over the high 
cost fossil fuel source altogether.  
























The path of global temperatures for Simulations 5 and 6 are graphed in Figure 2.  
Developing cheaper renewables technology does accelerate global warming initially as 
in the earlier simulations, however because the second source of fossil fuels is now 12
untouched the eventual temperature increase under Simulation 6 is lower.  Only half the 
fossil fuel reserves are used if renewables technology development is accelerated, and 
this shift in resource use is the dominant effect on eventual global temperatures.  
However it is easy to imagine that a different result could occur, such as if there were 
large amounts of “cheap” fossil fuels and only a small reserve of “expensive” fossil 
fuels.
Conclusions
The answer to the question in the title is “Yes, it can, but…”  As always with complex 
issues, the answers must be hedged with qualifications.
The outcome of cheaper renewables depends on the level of eventual GHG emissions, 
which in turn will depend on the extraction costs of the different sources of fossil fuels, 
and on the rate at which they are produced.  Developing cheaper renewables has two 
effects, accelerating consumption of fossil fuels, and a second effect, locking out certain 
fossil fuels from consumption.  These two effects move global warming in opposite 
directions.  If we make policy perspections about renewables technology, we should 
include both of these effects in our global climate models.
The outcome of anticipated rising taxes on GHG emissions is identical to faster 
development of renewables technology.  Future taxes lower the value of future 
consumption and so accelerate fossil fuel consumption today.  However future taxes 
may lock out high priced sources of fossil fuels and so may reduce eventual production 
of GHGs.  The net effect on global temperatures is ambigous.
What policy response could prevent this acceleration of fossil fuel consumption today?  
Cheaper renewables and future carbon taxes accelerate consumption today because they 
reduce the value of future production of fossil fuels.  One policy to counter this effect 
would be to have a declining tax on fossil fuels, or perhaps even a subsidy on future 
fossil fuel production, to increase the value of future production relative to production 
today.  
The problem we are confronting is that the policy prescriptions which flow out of global 
climate models are not adequately addressing the incentives facing participants in the 
energy market.  The supply side responses to policy have been ignored in the models 
used for global climate modelling.  That the models biologists use have naïve economic 
models is not surprising and is even understandable.  That the models used by 
economists have no supply responses is more difficult to accept.  
Chakravorty et al. (1995) despite very carefully modelling the process of transitioning 
from one energy source to alternative energy sources ignore the effect of cheaper 
renewable energy on the supply of fossil fuels.  Likewise in Nordhaus (1992, 1999) a 
policy path for carbon taxes is modelled without recognizing that the possibility of 
future taxes will affect the supply of fossil fuels today.  Neither the Global Trade and 
Environment Model (GTEM) used by ABARE economists nor the MMRF-Green model 
used by the Allen Consulting Group have supply responses in the energy market.13
The atmospheric physics is far more sophisticated than the economic modelling in our 
global climate models.  Surely if we are to use global climate models to inform policy-
making, we must improve the economic modelling within them.14
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